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Abstract:  This paper examines how employment protection legislation affects location
decisions of multinationals.  Based on a simple theoretical framework, we estimate an
empirical model, using OECD-data on bilateral FDI-flows and employment protection
indices.  We find that, while an “unfavourable” employment protection differential between a
domestic and a foreign location is inimical to foreign direct investment (FDI), a high
domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI.  The results are in
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11. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the effects of labour market flexibility (or the
lack of it) on the location of economic activity.
The increasing degree of economic integration and the liberalisation of foreign direct
investment (FDI) policies worldwide have brought the determinants of the location of
economic activity to the forefront of policy debates, with governments’ concerns focussing
increasingly on their ability to prevent domestic industry from relocating abroad and to attract
and/or retain foreign investment.
Labour market laws and institutions are commonly regarded as crucial in determining
the relative attractiveness of locations to internationally mobile firms.  Amongst these,
employment protection laws are perceived as being particularly harmful because they reduce
the flexibility with which firms can adjust output and employment to evolving economic
conditions.  Increasingly, the substantial differences that exist between economies (even
within the European Union) in hiring and firing restrictions are seen as a source of unfair
‘competitive advantage’ for those locations with lower costs of employment adjustments.
Although a substantial amount of work exists on the impact of employment legislation
on employment,1 little research has been done on the relationship between the former and the
location of industry. 2  To our knowledge, the limited body of articles that addresses this
relationship focuses on the role of employment protection in undermining a location’s ability
to attract new footloose industry.  However, the degree of labour market flexibility also
                                                                
1 Hiring and firing restrictions are typically not found to have a decisive role on overall rates of unemployment
(e.g. Nickell 1996, 2001), but are shown to reduce job reallocation rates and employment variation over the
business cycle – e.g. Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Garibaldi et al. (1997), OECD (1996).
2 Haaland and Wooton (2002) and Haaland et al. (2003) provide related theoretical analyses, showing that
countries with more flexible labour markets attract inward investment.  By contrast, Dewit et al. (2003) argue
that labour market inflexibility may not necessarily hinder a country’s ability to retain (and under certain
conditions even attract) economic activity; since inflexibility implies commitment power, firms may prefer an
inflexible location over a flexible one, even in an uncertain environment.  In an empirical study, Görg (2002)
finds that host countries’ firing costs are negatively related to inward FDI from the US.  Nicoletti et al. (2003)
find that employment protection reduces FDI in OECD countries.  Brown et al. (2003) is a general discursive
paper on the relationship between FDI and working conditions in developing countries.
2affects countries’ ability to retain their existing industrial base, what we refer to as ‘domestic
anchorage’3.  In disregaridng this aspect, which is central to policy debates, the existing
literature fails to capture the complexity of the effects of employment protection on industry
location.
In order to fill this gap, we use a simple theoretical model to examine how differences
in employment protection regulations affect (1) the location decision of a new firm, when
alternative locations are possible, and (2) the relocation incentives of an existing production
facility.  We then test empirically the predictions of the model using data on bilateral FDI
flows and employment protection indices obtained from the OECD.  Our empirical analysis
suggests that employment protection laws are likely to have different effects on firms’
location decisions: whilst an ‘unfavourable’ employment protection differential between a
domestic and a foreign location is inimical to inward FDI, a high domestic level of
employment protection tends to discourage outflow FDI.  We also find that the effect of
employment protection depends on the level of investment cost in the host country.  In
particular, FDI costs tend to reinforce the anchorage effect of employment protection.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical
framework.  Section 3 estimates an econometric model of bilateral FDI using OECD data.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Employment protection and location
We firstly analyse the decision of a monopolist considering whether to set up a new
production facility in its home country h or to locate in foreign country f.  Countries h and f
                                                                
3 A theoretical analysis of the ‘attraction versus retention’ effects of employment protection in strategic settings
is developed by Dewit, Leahy and Montagna (2003).
3represent an integrated market and production costs are the same in each location. 4  We
assume, however, there to be an FDI cost which the firm will incur in the case it decides to
locate abroad.
There are two periods.  In period one, the firm knows demand for that period but faces
uncertainty about period-two demand, which is resolved at the start of period two.  The
inverse demands for period one and two are given by 11 qap -=  and uqap +-= 22 , where
tp  and tq  denote price and quantity (with t=1,2), a is a positive constant, and [ ]uuu ,Î  is a
stochastic demand component, with mean 0=Eu  and variance v .
Since future demand is uncertain, the firm values flexibility.  However, flexibility
may be hindered by employment protection regulations in the local labour market.
Employment protection gives rise to hiring and firing costs when future output needs to be
adjusted in line with the demand then prevailing.  Suppose total variable costs in location i (i
= h, f) are given by
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where c  is the constant marginal cost of production without intertemporal output adjustments
(i.e., if 12 qq = ).  The second term in expression (1) reflects adjustment costs (e.g.
Hamermesh, 1996), with il  denoting the location-specific degree of employment protection.
Total costs consist of the sum of variable costs and fixed set-up costs ( iF ), with hF =f and
df +=fF .  That is, if the firm locates abroad, the set up cost includes an investment cost d
> 0 that can be thought of as reflecting the barriers to the mobility of capital.  Hence, d will
typically fall as the degree of market integration increases.
                                                                
4 These assumptions allow us to focus on the effect of employment protection on location choice, while
abstracting from other location determinants, such as market access and cost advantages whose importance for
firms’ location decisions is well understood.  See, for instance, Markusen (2002).
4Expected profits are equal to 21 ppp EE += .  Forward looking, when choosing its optimal
output in period two, the monopolist maximises second-period profits given 1q , implying
0)(2 122 =--+- qquqA il , (2a)
with caA -º .  Assuming that the firm is risk neutral,5 it determines its optimal output in
period one by maximising expected profit with respect to period-one output, yielding the
following first-order condition
0)(2 121 =-+- qEqqA il . (2b)
The firm’s optimal output in period one and in period two are, respectively, given by
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Expression (3b) clearly shows that the firm will be more flexible in period two if the local
degree of employment protection is low ( dudq i /2  decreases in il ).
From the inverse demand functions, the first-order conditions in (2a) and (2b), and
since 12 ii qEq = , maximised expected profits can be written as
i
i
ii F
v
qE -
+
+=
2
2
1 )2(
)(2
l
p (4)
Expected profits decrease in the degree of employment protection that prevails in the local
labour market ( 0/ <ii ddE lp ).
6  Hence, the location decision of the monopolist will be
influenced by the difference between the expected profits in the two locations – which
depends on the difference in employment protection between them and on the cost of FDI (d).
If the barriers to FDI flows are prohibitively high (i.e. d is very large), the monopolist will set
up the new plant in Home, regardless of the size and sign of the employment protection
                                                                
5 Risk aversion would simply make locating in the country with the more flexible labour market relatively more
attractive.
5differential between home and foreign. With very low FDI costs, i.e. with very high degrees
of capital market integration, a new firm seeking to minimise future adjustment costs will
choose to produce in the location characterised by the lower degree of employment
protection.  At intermediate levels of FDI costs, the monopolist will always locate in Home if
0)( >- hf ll , and will locate in foreign if )( hf ll -  is negative and sufficiently large
7.
Hence, for non-prohibitively high FDI costs, a given increase in )( hf ll -  will be more
likely to deter FDI from h to f the larger is d.
2.2. Employment protection and relocation
The effects of employment protection on location decisions will differ in the case of a
relocation of an existing plant.  Suppose that a firm with an operating plant in h considers
relocating to f.  Just like a new firm – provided that the FDI costs are not too high – ceteris
paribus, this firm is more likely to produce abroad if it expects that future adjustments in its
workforce will be less costly to carry out in f than in h.  However, if there is some degree of
employment protection in h, relocation implies that the firm will incur exit costs in the form
of severance pay to laid-off workers in its h-plant.  Hence, even relatively moderate home
employment protection may discourage relocation and effectively serve as a ‘domestic
anchorage’ device, thus hindering outward FDI.  The anchorage effect of employment
protection will also be conceivably stronger the higher are FDI costs, i.e. a firm may be even
more reluctant to face the occurrence of severance costs associated with relocation in the
presence of high FDI costs.
To summarise, our theoretical analysis suggests that both the difference in
employment protection between f and h ( hf ll - ) and the actual level of employment
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 Note that, since profits are convex in u, expected profits increase in n.
7 These conclusions hold because the firm is a monopolist.  With oligopolistic rivalry, firms’ location decisions
are more complex (see Dewit, Leahy and Montagna, 2003).
6protection in h ( hl ) may be negatively related to outward FDI (from h to f). On the one hand,
as a determinant of the home market ‘flexibility differential’ ( hf ll - ), a high level of home
employment protection will encourage relocation; on the other hand, by determining the
extent of exit costs, it will act as an ‘anchor’ for the domestic industry, thus making
international relocation less likely.  The extent of capital market integration is also likely to
affect the responsiveness of investment flows to employment protection: ceteris paribus, both
a higher flexibility differential in favour of the home country – i.e. a larger ( hf ll - ) – and a
higher level of home EP are likely to be having a stronger negative effect on outward FDI
flows the larger is d.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we bring empirical evidence to bear on the theoretical predictions of the
previous analysis. To this end, we estimate an empirical model of the determinants of
outward FDI flows from home country h to partner country f using OECD data.  The
regression equation is given by:
hftthfthtfthfththtfththft XFDI ebdllgdlgllglga ++-++-++= ]*)[()*()()ln( 4321      (5)
where lht is a measure of employment protection (EP) in home country h at time t and (lft –
lht) is the difference in employment protection at time t between host and home country.
According to our theoretical analysis, other things equal, the higher the level of employment
protection in the foreign location, the lower will be the home country’s investment in that
location.  We therefore would expect the coefficient g2 to be negative.  The coefficient g1
captures the ‘domestic anchorage’ effect described in the theoretical model and is also
expected to be negative.  The theory also suggests that the sensitivity of FDI flows to
employment protection may depend on the level of investment costs.  In order to capture this
effect, we include interaction terms of our employment protection variables with investment
7cost, multiplying lht and (lft - lht) by a dummy variable d equal to one if investment costs are
higher than the median in the sample.8
The vector X captures a number of additional covariates that potentially affect the
location of FDI.  These are:
(1) the level of partner country GDP, which is included in order to control for the market size
of the host economy.  We would expect a positive relationship between this variable and
FDI inflows into the partner country (see Culem, 1988).
(2) the level of home country GDP, included in order to control for the size of the home
country, which determines the supply of FDI (Blonigen, 1997).
(3) a trade-weighted measure of unit labour costs, included to control for differences in the
costs of inputs across countries (see Culem, 1988).
(4) a dummy variable which is equal to one if home and partner country are members of a
free trade area.  This is included to capture the potentially positive effect of membership
of a trade agreement on FDI (see, for example, Barrell and Pain, 1999)
The data for all variables come from the OECD.  Data on bilateral FDI flows are
taken from the OECD’s International Investment Statistics Yearbook.  The index of
employment protection for each country – as described by Nicoletti et al. (1999) – is based on
measures of protection affecting the country’s temporary and regular employment.9  The
index – which takes on values between 0 and 100 from the least to the most restrictive – is
available for only two years (namely 1989 and 1998), thus restricting considerably the time
                                                                
8 One may argue that we should also include the level of investment cost on its own in the equation.  Our
concern is that this variable is highly correlated with the two interaction terms (with correlation coefficients of
0.64 and – 0.25 respectively) which can potentially lead to multicollinearity problems in our sample.  In fact,
estimations of equation (5) also including d on its own, which are not reported here but are available from the
authors upon request, yield statistically insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms but negative and
statistically significant coefficients on d, as expected.  The coefficients on the other variables are very similar to
those reported below.  Hence, in order to reflect our emphasis on the interaction between d and employment
protection we report only the results of equation (5) without the level of investment cost.
9 The employment protection indicators were constructed “based on an in-depth review of existing regulations
and laws affecting the hiring and firing of workers along the two dimensions of regular and temporary
contracts” (Nicoletti et al., 1999, pp. 40-41).
8series dimension of our analysis.  The cost of investment (d) is a measure of the cost of
capital for investments from home to partner and is also an index between 0 and 100 (as is the
unit labour cost variable).  All nominal variables, i.e. FDI and GDP, are converted into real
1995 US dollars.
Table 1 reports summary data on a country’s total inward and outward FDI flows and
its employment protection index for the two years 1989 and 1998.  Apart from the former
communist countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland which have employment
protection indices of 100 for 1989,10 the countries with the highest levels of employment
protection among OECD countries are South Korea, Portugal and Spain.  At the other
extreme we find the US, UK and Canada with very low levels of employment protection in
1989.  It is notable that for most countries for which there have been changes between 1989
and 1998, the level of employment protection has fallen, with the exception of France.
[Table 1 here]
At first sight, these data only point to a loose connection between FDI and
employment protection: for instance, Canada (a country with a fairly low level of EP) had
relatively low levels of inward and outward FDI in 1989 but much higher levels in 1998.  The
nature of the relationship, however, cannot be adequately captured by these summary data.  A
better appreciation of the effects of employment protection on FDI flows can be gained by
estimating our empirical model described in equation (5) using bilateral data.
Given that the employment protection index is only available for two years, we
estimate two independent cross sections, using the data for 1989 and 1998 separately.  The
results of the estimations of different specifications of equation (5) are reported in Table 2.
For the year 1989 we have 277 country pairs available while there are 388 in 1998.11
                                                                
10 Note that these countries are not included in the econometric estimations for 1989, given the absence of FDI
data for that year.
11 In the estimations we allow for heteroskedasticity of the error term, as well as an unspecified correlation
between error terms within, but not across, partner countries.  This allows for the possibility that there may be
9[Table 2 here]
Columns (1) and (3) report results without the FTA dummy, while columns (2) and
(4) include this dummy. While the dummy is consistently positive and statistically significant
as expected, its inclusion does not alter the other coefficients substantially, indicating the
robustness of the results.  The estimations show that the positive effect of the home and
partner country market sizes on FDI is accurately reflected in the data in both years.  We do
not find a statistically significant effect of unit labour costs on FDI, however.12
The results on the employment protection measures and the interaction terms with
investment costs are broadly consistent with our theoretical predictions.  The higher the level
of employment protection in the home country the lower the level of outward FDI, ceteris
paribus.  This negative effect is larger if investment cost between home and foreign are high.
Our findings therefore suggest that: (i) the ‘domestic anchorage’ effect is important, i.e.,
more protective employment laws at home – by increasing the exit costs associated with
international relocation – discourage firms from investing abroad; and (ii) FDI costs tend to
reinforce the sensitivity of outward investment flows to employment protection, effectively
strengthening the anchorage effect of the latter.
We also find that the larger the gap in employment protection between partner and
home country the lower are FDI flows from home to partner.  This suggests that, for a given
level of home EP, higher levels of EP in the partner country discourage home country firms
from investing there.  Examining the coefficient on the interaction term, we now find that
higher investment cost only tend to amplify the negative effect of the employment protection
differential in 1998.
This, as well as a cursory glance at the regression coefficients may suggest that the
effects of employment protection on FDI are more pronounced in 1998 than in 1989.  In
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
unobserved country specific effects which are correlated with the regressors but which we do not explicitly
account for in the empirical model.
10
order to examine whether these differences are statistically significant we estimate a model
pooling the data for 1989 and 1998 and including interaction terms with all explanatory
variables and a dummy for 1998.  The estimation results are reported in Table 3.13
Note that an F-test for the joint significance of the interaction terms allows us to reject
the hypothesis that these terms are jointly equal to zero.  Inspection of the individual
interaction terms suggests that for home and partner GDP, unit labour cost, and the free trade
area dummy there are no statistically significant differences in the coefficients.  This is
different for the EP variables, however.  Here, we find that for the level of home EP and for
the interaction of EP difference with investment costs the coefficients for 1998 are larger (i.e.
more negative) than for 1989.  In column (1), e.g., the total effect of home employment
protection in 1998 is –0.042 compared with –0.022 for 1989, while the coefficient on the
interaction between EP differential and investment cost is –0.022 in 1998 and 0 in 1989.
These results are in line with the coefficients reported in the independent cross sections in
Table 2.
 [Table 3 here]
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have examined theoretically and empirically the relationship between
bilateral FDI flows and employment protection levels for a number of OECD countries.  Our
main findings are consistent with our theoretical analysis and suggest that: (1) domestic
levels of employment protection – by discouraging outward FDI – act as an ‘anchorage’
device for domestic industry, (2) employment protection differentials between foreign and
home country are negatively related to FDI outflows, (3) both the anchorage and the EP
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
12 This result is mirrored in a large number of empirical studies (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992).
13 Again, we allow for heteroskedasticity of the error term and, in order to capture possible correlation over time
of error terms for country pairs, allow for an unspecified correlation of error terms within country pairs.
11
differential effects are stronger the higher are FDI costs, and (4) the sensitivity of FDI flows
to both employment protection levels and differentials has increased between 1989 and 1998.
Overall, the empirical analysis carried out in this paper suggests that the relationship
between labour market rigidities and international investment flows is more complex than
what is implied by the conventional wisdom.  Some tentative but interesting policy
conclusions can be drawn from our results.  Given that employment protection can help to
anchor domestic industry by discouraging relocation, industrialised countries with a large
industrial base will be able to sustain high levels of hiring and firing costs.  Developing
countries with a small industrial base may instead have an incentive to pursue flexible labour
market policies.  Clearly, given the highly aggregate nature of our data, these conclusions
ought to be taken with caution.  More generally, however, this analysis points to the
theoretical possibility of a strategic intertemporal use of labour standards, whereby low
employment protection could be used to attract inward investment to a given location and
could then be subsequently raised to lock the investment in. 14
                                                                
14 See Leahy and Montagna (2000) for a theoretical analysis of the strategic use of unionisation laws.
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Table 1: FDI and employment protection
1989 1998
Inflows Outflows EP Inflows Outflows EP
Australia 2.50% 1.78% 17.6 1.62% 1.27% 17.6
Austria 0.45% 0.63% 39.8 2.62% 1.12% 39.8
BLEU 4.08% 3.09% 50.3 7.92% 10.01% 34.8
Canada 0.87% 0.87% 10.6 3.61% 4.80% 10.6
Czech Republic .. .. 100 6.16% 0.02% 28.8
Denmark 1.03% 1.90% 40.6 3.72% 2.76% 24.9
Finland 0.31% 2.25% 37 9.84% 14.89% 34.9
France 0.95% 1.74% 45.5 1.89% 2.23% 51.3
Germany 0.58% 1.20% 59.2 1.20% 3.87% 46.3
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 60.2 0.00% 0.05% 58.8
Hungary .. .. 100 0.00% 0.00% 23.7
Ireland 0.49% 3.77% 16.8 0.25% 8.36% 16.8
Italy 0.56% 0.30% 69.2 0.24% 0.46% 54.7
Japan 0.08% 1.81% 44.1 0.21% 0.68% 44.1
New Zealand 1.03% 0.73% 16.8 5.05% 2.30% 17.2
Netherlands 2.09% 3.78% 51 9.24% 8.24% 39.4
Norway 1.54% 1.30% 51.6 2.66% 1.35% 48.1
Poland .. .. 100 3.90% 0.18% 30.8
Portugal 2.40% 0.12% 70.1 1.59% 1.57% 62.5
South Korea 0.35% 0.14% 100 1.46% 0.50% 45.8
Spain 1.83% 0.47% 61 1.98% 1.55% 53.6
Sweden 0.54% 3.79% 57.4 6.83% 6.88% 40.5
Switzerland 0.05% 0.00% 21.2 3.45% 4.60% 21.2
Turkey 0.00% 0.00% 60.2 0.48% 0.01% 60.2
UK 3.36% 3.76% 8.6 4.78% 7.94% 8.6
USA 1.16% 0.55% 3.7 2.05% 1.27% 3.7
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Table 2: Basic regression results for outward FDI flows
(Dependent variable: ln FDI flows from home to partner)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1989 1989 1998 1998
Partner GDP 0.601 0.658 0.635 0.600
(0.134)*** (0.128)*** (0.137)*** (0.103)***
Home GDP 0.967 1.031 0.887 0.933
(0.123)*** (0.121)*** (0.074)*** (0.076)***
Partner unit labour cost 0.354 0.678 0.615 0.239
(0.932) (0.759) (0.982) (0.635)
Home EP -0.016 -0.025 -0.042 -0.066
(0.011) (0.010)** (0.009)*** (0.008)***
Home EP * Investment
cost
-0.022 -0.019 -0.041 -0.025
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)***
EP differential -0.023 -0.027 -0.025 -0.034
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)***
EP differential *
Investment cost
-0.001 0.002 -0.023 -0.022
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014)* (0.010)**
FTA dummy 1.339 1.491
(0.274)*** (0.275)***
Observations 277 277 388 388
R-squared 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.46
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered by partner country, in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
regression includes constant term
15
Table 3: Regression results with interaction terms
(Dependent variable: ln FDI flows from home to partner)
(1) (2)
Partner GDP 0.601 0.658
(0.091)*** (0.089)***
1998 * Partner GDP 0.033 -0.058
(0.113) (0.110)
Home GDP 0.967 1.031
(0.105)*** (0.106)***
1998 * Home GDP -0.080 -0.097
(0.118) (0.120)
Partner unit labour cost 0.354 0.678
(0.622) (0.587)
1998 * Partner unit labour
cost
0.260 -0.438
(0.857) (0.825)
Home EP -0.016 -0.025
(0.010) (0.009)***
1998 * Home EP -0.026 -0.041
(0.013)** (0.013)***
Home EP* Investment cost -0.022 -0.019
(0.007)*** (0.006)***
1998 * (Home EP *
Investment cost)
-0.019 -0.006
(0.009)** (0.009)
EP differential -0.023 -0.027
(0.006)*** (0.006)***
1998 * EP differential -0.002 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008)
EP differential *
Investment cost
-0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.008)
1998 * (EP differential *
Investment cost)
-0.022 -0.024
(0.012)* (0.011)**
FTA dummy 1.339
(0.282)***
1998 * FTA dummy 0.152
(0.343)
Observations 665 665
F (interaction terms) 4.85*** 2.93***
R-squared 0.38 0.45
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered by country-pairs, in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
regression includes constant and (1998 * constant) terms
